Gaza: What Went Wrong and Can it be Fixed?

The Problem and Six Points to Fix it

Although it seems that Israel is finally starting its Rafah offensive Gaza has become for Israel, if not a quagmire, certainly a diplomatic trap.  Israel has eliminated most of the Hamas organized fighting forces, its “brigades” so to speak in the northern and central Gazan cities as well as Khan Yunis in the south.   The most strategically successful asset that the war has brought to Israel is that which they started the war with – the Netzarim corridor, an east-west road -  1 to 1.5 kms wide -  that goes from the Israeli border to the sea.  This corridor has been expanded and fortified and has essentially cut Gaza into two.  Large amounts of Hamas fighters and arms cannot cross this corridor and the IDF operates there safely. 

At the end of December, after a bit over two months of the ground incursion was the time when the country started to realize that the IDF and the political echelon – the War Cabinet led by three ex-generals (two ex-chiefs of staff) and the Prime Minister had made three strategic errors.   At some point after that (because the people in general have more common sense than their leaders and talking heads) the political, military and “cultural” establishment also realized that they had painted themselves into a corner.

It suddenly hit them -again, most of us commoners had been scratching our heads over this from early on – that they ought to have taken the Philadelphia corridor and the city of Rafah early on in order to control the strategic tunnels that keeps Hamas connected to the outside world.    The second thing they realized is that they ought to have established control over areas that Hamas could not penetrate in order to allow Gazan women and children a safe haven.  We wrote about this early on in the war (Hamas Free Zones in Gaza).  The third strategic error was in their not planning for the infamous “day after”.   That was actually the topic of our first post here – Gaza After the War – a solution that could still work, although with modifications.  

All of these “errors” were based on one false reading of the global situation in general and the Biden administration view in particular.   This assumption was that there was a consensus that Hamas’s barbarity must be countered with their destruction.   In truth, the Biden administration, via its main foreign policy disaster machine, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, wanted to follow the Obamian “don’t let a good crisis go to waste” philosophy and to remake the middle east in its own image.    This meant a smaller and weaker Israel, a Palestinian State on the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza and an alignment with Saudi Arabia that would NOT fight against a revolutionary and nuclear Iran but will balance it in a balance of terror much like the cold war.   This would fill the three main policy goals of the Democratic Party’s radical left wing – to create a Palestinian State, to weaken both Israel and the Saudis and force them to adopt progressive policies and the rapprochement with Iran, whose main asset to the radical left is its anti-Western ideology. 

On October 7, when it seemed that Israel was in total chaos and the IDF command couldn’t get a handle on the situation the Blinken “mind” went into overdrive and was sure that Israel would do whatever is necessary to save it from the Hamas onslaught even surrender its war-making authority to the United States.   The Israeli leadership, still in shock gave into and encouraged this way of thinking by not only inviting Blinken into its War Cabinet meetings but in allowing him to be involved in war planning.  Biden, on his visit to Israel to show support also sat in on a meeting but it was Blinken who was calling the shots.   Israeli leadership, from Prime Minster Netanyahu to Defense Minister Galant, to the two ex-generals who joined the national unity government, Benny Gantz and Gadi Eizenkott backed intensive US involvement.

Although all the leaders, from Netanyahu to Defense Minister Galant to Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi were adamant that the goal was to destroy Hamas and kill its leaders, we have heard that talk before.   It was not clear to the country that the leaders would have the guts to follow through and it was certainly the plan of Biden-Blinken that Israel does not follow through.

But both came up against something no one predicted – the unity of the country and the arrival of 350,000 reservists to their bases and along with it the demand for the total destruction of Hamas. The people were determined to destroy Hamas – not due to revenge but because on that fateful morning, we all understood that we had been betrayed by years false claims, false confidence and disastrous policy decisions. 

In response to the demand of the people, the politicians talked tough and the IDF came up with plans to take Gaza and destroy Hamas and bring home the hostages.  Morale in the country turned on a dime as stories poured in of bravery and self sacrifice by the officers and soldiers who, mostly on their own, re-took the kibbutzim and towns that Hamas conquered.  In the meanwhile, the air force woke up and started to bomb strategic targets in Gaza.  This was the Israeli modus operandi until now – threatening statements backed up by air power and the Biden administration can’t be blamed if it thought this was the current MO, too. 

However, the anger in the country was too great and in spite of tremendous pressure from Biden-Blinken that included a planeload of US military officers to talk the IDF out of a ground incursion, and in spite of the overly cautious playbooks that both Netanyahu and the IDF had advocated for the last few decades, an invasion plan was developed and approved by the War Cabinet.

But the plan itself had two flaws – one based on the assumption that the United States government understood that it was in their own national interests that Hamas, the proxy of the Russia-China-Iran Axis, needed to be destroyed in order to prove to the rest of the world that the US was would and could lead the free world.   I too, made this assumption as I was convinced that at this point Biden-Blinken would finally realize that the Islamic Republic of Iran needed to be radically weakened if not destroyed.   I should have seen it from the beginning of course when the Administration went out of its way to deny Iranian involvement.   However, as a child of the Cold War I know that even President Jimmy Carter understood the nature of the Soviet Union after their invasion of Afghanistan – I couldn’t imagine that Biden-Blinken wouldn’t understand the nature of Iran and its effect on US national interests.  I was wrong and the Israeli leadership was wrong.

The second flaw is related to the first and it is that the US would pressure Egypt to setup refugee camps in the Sinai – as it borders with Gaza.  Certainly, the thought went, the US would use its enormous economic leverage on Egypt to relieve the suffering of the Gazans.   Elliot Kaufman has an excellent piece in the WSJ calling this Biden’s biggest mistake of the war.  He makes some very good points but gets one big thing wrong – allowing Gazans to escape as war refugees to Egyptian Sinai (which according to Kaufman is what international law demands) would relieve pressure on Israel to “solve” the Palestinian problem – and that of course was the chief war aim of foreign policy disaster machine, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken.

But the most logical and moral effort of the war, opening the Egyptian border,  was never going to happen, and Israel did not take this into consideration so did not take the Gaza-Egypt border in the first stages of the war.   This could have been corrected shortly after this became apparent and even later when the Khan Yunis operations stared in the south of Gaza. Israel could have taken at least a good chunk of the border area and formed a second east-West corridor cutting Rafah off from Khan Yunis and other points south of the Netzarim corridor – surrounding and isolating Rafah without going in yet.

In addition, Israel itself ought to have setup the “Hamas free zones” we spoke about above for women and children, funded and run by Arab governments or organizations that are not hostile to Israel (meaning no UN and no Red Cross).  Admittedly, there are not many of those in the world, but with enough money, some could step forward. 

I have not mentioned the hostages and the internal pressure brought on the government by the ruling 5% - that combination of American progressive money along with ex-Army officers and politicians like Ehud Barak and Yair Golan along with a small percentage of Israel’s own monied classes and of course – the mainstream media who can’t resist a left wing cause. 

Regarding the hostages, this is another failure of the military plan and the government.   First this is a failure of Israeli military intelligence including the Mossad and the Shaback.   Even after capturing over 1,000 Hamas and Jihad leaders they have been able to locate and save only 3 of the over 200 hostages that were taken.  One was at the very start of the war leading to false hopes for the country and the second was the daring rescue of 2 hostages in Rafah over a month ago.  Cutting Gaza into more pieces – like the extra Khan Yunis corridor and keeping military pressure on Hamas leadership as opposed to depending on Qatar and Egypt to put diplomatic pressure on them might have led to a real second deal that is like the first one.   Alternatively, it might have led to actually freeing some hostages in military operations – although that is pure conjecture.  In any event – more military pressure would not have made matters worse. 

Regarding the “day after” plan this seems to have been obvious to everyone except Netanyahu.  He saw the Palestinian State issue coming and instead of coming up with a plan to make others react to - to accept, reject or modify – Netanyahu just decided to react.   The Biden-Blinken plan for the PA to rule after Hamas was a non-starter for Israel.   Besides a few anti-Zionists who write for Ha’aretz,  no one in the country would have tolerated, let alone supported such a plan.  But rather than bring a suggestion of his own, he just ignored it.  As a matter of fact, the new Military Secretary for the Prime Minister, General Roman Bronfman wrote a plan that called for IDF rule for a period of three years.    (Then Brigadier General Bronfman was seriously wounded on October 7 as he ran down to fight Hamas.  He has been an armored division man for his career and is known for stating a few years ago to allow the ground forces to do their work in Gaza). 

There were other plans that were suggested (like ours, linked to above) that called for all sorts of combinations of Israeli, local Gazan or international rule until Hamas fighters can be cleaned out totally.  But the PM rejected all for his basic way of dealing with these issues is the kick the can down the road.  Sometimes that works.  A history professor of mine once said that the British Empire lasted as long as it did because it always just “muddled through”, not actually solving problems.  But in this case,  by leaving a vacuum in the places the IDF withdrew from in northern Gaza and now Khan Yunis, Netanyahu has allowed Hamas to claw back control without an active civil or military force in place to prevent it.

Can this situation be fixed?

1.       I would think that a change in leadership would be a good starting point.  As there is no one with the public support in the current Knesset that would satisfy the people (let alone the parliamentarians) elections can be called.  In the past I suggested the first quarter of 2025 but November or December of this year would work, too.  In the meanwhile, the Defense Minister and IDF Chief of Staff need to be replaced and the person to take that on should be Avigdor Lieberman of the Yisrael Beiteinu Party who, as Defense Minister in 2016 wrote a 9 page paper warning of exactly what happened on October 7 and called for a pre-emptive strike into Gaza.   This was ignored by both Netanyahu and then IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkott (the same men who now sit on and lead the War Cabinet).  

2.       Enter Rafah immediately and cut it off from Khan Yunis.  Take control of the border area and systematically destroy the strategic tunnels that have supplied and continue to supply Hamas with weapons and support.    Destroy the remaining Hamas brigades and double down on freeing hostages and killing Hamas leadership.

3.       Return the two divisions to the north and center of Gaza in order to rule it and to cleanse it of the remaining Hamas civil and military centers.  Create Hamas free zones and bring in Gazan women and children.    Even if this is one or two square kilometers at a time, this will create the conditions for “the day after”.

4.       Devise a “day after” plan that prevents Hamas and the PA from ruling Gaza.  Getting Arab governments to be heavily involved may more difficult now that the US will also oppose it – but governments like Morocco, UAE and Saudi Arabia might be tempted to join if they can convince non-Hamas locals to partner with them.  All of these governments want Hamas destroyed, even if they don’t say it out loud.

5.       Declare war on Iran.   This does not mean attack them daily.  This means that Iran has to know that it is the official policy of the State of Israel to severely weaken the Islamic Republic of Iran and encourage regime change there.

6.       Start rebuilding the kibbutzim that were partially destroyed by Hamas on October 7.  Nothing says victory like rebuilding what your enemies destroyed while they work their way through rubble. This is important and ought to be done now.

It is not too late to win this war which we were on the brink of doing at the end of December.   When the US was being frustrated in Iraq it changed the Secretary of Defense and the military leadership and devised a new strategy that led them to victory.  

If Biden-Blinken don’t interrupt it and if these steps can be taken, Israel  and the West can win this war and give a boost to free countries everywhere.   The major problem though is the Administration’s adamant demand that Israel not win, at any costs.  The constant concessions that Israel gives are just pocketed for the next round.  Now Hamas has “accepted” a cease fire deal that neither the US nor Israel have seen.   Israel, correctly, is ignoring this game, although for how long it is not clear as Biden-Blinken want this war stopped, no matter the consequences. 

The foreign policy disaster machine, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, it seems needs time to work on his next disaster before he leaves office, so he needs to see this “Gaza thing” ended.    He already has the Afghanistan and Ukraine disasters to his name and he is oh so close to getting another notch on his belt in the middle-east.    So far in the middle east he has managed to make Hamas heroes in the State Department and on US campuses, has managed to destroy a 200 year tradition of the US Navy defending freedom of the seas (with the last 80 years as the guarantor of freedom of the seas) by hamstringing the US Navy in their fight against the Houthis and of course has strengthened Iran’s grip on the region.   The defeat of Israel in Gaza would be the cherry on top.  Who is the foreign policy disaster machine’s, next on target?  Philippines?  Taiwan?   Venezuela?  There are so many choices and so little time.

The above six steps can turn Gaza from a trap into a victory for Israel, for the West, for decency. Let’s hope the US and Israeli governments don’t blow it yet again.