A New Strategy for Defeating Hamas: A War of Attrition Until Victory
Can Israel Turn the Tables on Hamas?
I have been a critic of the current strategy in Gaza and have called for setting up Hamas free zones where women and children can live safely and Hamas would be systematically destroyed, but that would require Israel to go area by area and totally clear everything military above and below ground. I still feel that that is the correct way to end the Hamas presence in Gaza but the Israeli establishment (the government and security bigwigs) thinks otherwise.
The IDF’s and the government’s strategy is to capture an area, destroy the main Hamas battle group, tunnels and infrastructure and leave in such a way so as to be able to re-enter at will and destroy any Hamas capabilities that are rebuilt. I think that the IDF has been surprised in the past as to the quickness with which Hamas re-assembled its forces but a combination of artillery and air bombardment combined with tank and infantry has been able to destroy the re-built Hamas capabilities that it has found.
But this strategy has no endpoint. Essentially it says, we will wait for enough information to make pinpoint attacks. Victory is not the goal here.
A strategy where victory is the goal is needed – but one that will be acceptable to establishment (as we don’t see that changing too quickly).
With the Netzarim corridor cutting Gaza city and the northern Gaza camps from the south along with control of the Philadephi corridor and Rafah bordering Egypt, Israel has now cut Hamas off from its major resupply tunnels and freedom of movement from the two main areas in Gaza – Gaza city and its surrounding camps in the center and north and Khan Yunis and Rafah and its camps in the south.
If Israel stays in these two corridors and continues to occupy a buffer zone in the north and east of Gaza of approximately 2 kms, with proper intelligence (always a difficult thing) then Israel can conduct operations against Hamas and Jihad. They will be able to hide in tunnels and plan new attacks and they will be able to train new fighters but if Israel were to keep up constant bombardment and raids then Hamas power will slowly be sapped. The current strategy says wait for concentrations of Hamas fighters and let people live their lives, the War of Attrition strategy says, don’t let up the bombardment and the armored and infantry raids and don’t let the civilians rebuild. The residents of Gaza will continue to be given “humanitarian” aid but not be allowed to rebuild their houses. Those buildings that have not been destroyed will be potential targets of Israeli firepower if there are terrorists in or under these remaining buildings. Gazans can never be sure their house will not be next.
The goal, according to Government/IDF strategy has been to create a West Bank like situation where Israel has freedom of movement in the entire Gaza territory. The problem with that is that the West Bank situation has deteriorated since the border with Jordan is not airtight and Iran continues to smuggle in arms and without constant pressure on Hamas that will happen in Gaza, too. The other problem with this is that there is no chance of victory since there is no goal of victory. However, if Israel were to conduct a “war of attrition” in Gaza then they can continue to destroy whatever Hamas assets they suspect and stay for as long or as short as they desire. Tanks and artillery can continue to be used (as they are not now used in the West Bank) and Gazans will, as we stated, not be able to rebuild their homes until Hamas surrenders. The ball will be in Hamas’s court as to when to end the war. Their surrender or the exit of its main leadership and the freeing of the hostages can then be Israel’s goal instead of creating a west-bank like situation.
The difference of the “war of attrition” plan as opposed to the “West Bank plan” is that in the West Bank plan we look to create a standstill and in the War of Attrition plan the goal is actually the destruction of Hamas and victory. Israeli troops will be (mostly) out of range of Hamas fighters although we assume they still will have the ability to fire rockets to the surrounding towns and villages and mortars to Israeli soldiers. Hamas ammunition will be limited as will be their experienced fighters.
The wild card in this theory is of course the hostages and the proposed hostage deal that is currently being negotiated.
If the deal includes the ability of Israel to stay in the two corridors and maintain a buffer zone, Israel will be in a good position to continue its war of attrition against Hamas at any point. Of course, the six month cease fire that has been spoken about will give them a chance to regroup and possibly produce more ammunition (we can assume that some smuggling activity will continue from Egypt). Israel will then face a harder time with its raids after the six month period. If in fact 33 hostages are returned during this six month period (an assumption I would not make) there will be further pressure on Israel to withdraw for the rest of the hostages. Israel will need to resist this pressure.
With the strategy being a “war of attrition until victory” Israel can resume with extensive firepower and powerful raids while negotiating the next stages of the deal. This will both weaken Hamas and pressure them to surrender. If done properly this can be “three steps forward, one step back” rather than “one step forward, two steps back” – forward towards Israeli victory and Hamas defeat, that is.
The question remains can Israel turn the table and conduct a war of attrition it can win? In general, the stronger and more civilized power is at a disadvantage in a war of attrition as Israel is in the north as it has internal refugees it cares about. This is especially so when fighting guerrilla tactics. A strategy of attrition against Hamas -essentially starving and radically degrading the Hamas war machine – can be done if it is done consistently and ruthlessly (yes, ruthlessly). Then, Israel can turn its attention to Lebanon, Syria and Iran
With the amount of destruction that there already is in Gaza though, the question remains how much more can the Gazans take? No matter their desire to kill, rape and humiliate Israel and its Jews (and from October 7, not only its Jews) one would think there would be that tipping point where someone or some mass of people stands up and says, “no mas”. This won’t happen if there if they feel the destruction is over – but if it continues and the firepower increases rather than decreases and to them there is no end in site that changes the equation. If Hamas leaders can be humiliated in the process – so much the better.
Will they say “no mas”?
The Germans did. The Japanese did. A violent war of attrition against Hamas just might make the Gazans do it, too.
A mistake occurred at the beginning of the Gaza war when Israel subscribed to the Western plaint about innocent civilians in Gaza, of which there are none. By claiming that Hamas uses the population as human shields, Israel blurred the fact that the Gaza population is a willing participant in the Hamas onslaught against Israel. That fact, and the complicity of UN organizations in it, could only emerge in the course of the fighting, but it still has not made a dent in western consciousness, whose idiots still mouth off about starvation in Gaza that does not exist. This too forestalls the kind of warfare you rightly advocate. Indeed, Israel should issue an ultimatum to the people of Gaza: return the hostages and deliver Hamas or we will obliterate everything inside the strip. In short, Israel demands unconditional surrender. But caught between American fecklessness and an Israeli security elite backed by a certain portion of the Israeli public calling for a deal to return the hostages without total victory, Netanyahu and his government have done a pretty good job inching their way towards victory nonetheless. Because more and more people realize that Gaza must be totally pacified before Israel can turn its attention north to Lebanon, where the war will be much shorter and more intense and waged without the restraint imposed on Gaza. The International Court of Justice will scream as will the UN, EU, O'Biden White House, but the failure of diplomacy after two decades is evidence enough for holding Lebanon to account. By the way, there is no way Israel can control Gaza with only the IDF present, which means Jewish settlement must accompany the IDF in Gaza, and the strip must eventually be annexed to Israel as part of its historic homeland. Ditto for Judea and Samaria, which is no picnic these days either. The PA has to go too, and not as a governing body for Gaza.
Look, I agree with you, but with the Philadelphi corridor controlled, how does Hamas resupply weaponry?